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Introduction
Building an independent country based on the model of the presiden-
tial system was a characteristic legacy of the Communist period in most
post-Soviet republics. Although their regulations reflected the traditions of
a given country, the newly born independent countries in Central Asia ac-
cepted the declarations of independence and constitutions largely based on
western countries. The Constitutions of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan define explicitly a democratic character
of the state, political and ideological pluralism as well as the principle of
three-division of authorities. In some principal laws the role of political par-
ties has been exhibited. Apparently, the constitutions of the Central Asian
countries do not differ much from the constitutions of the countries belong-
ing to the consolidated democracy. In the principal laws of the post-Soviet
Asian republics one can find a solid catalogue of individual rights and li-
berties. However, the way the authority is held differs greatly from the
standards defined in the constitutions. In the post-Soviet republics there
has shaped a hybrid model of political relationships where the institution
of free elections has been carefully fixed gaining the range of the primary
assumption of democracy. At the same time, other principles of the demo-
cratic state under the rule of law have been marginalised, especially the
character and scope of the responsibility put on those who govern the co-
untries. The authority have failed to create the socio-political structures
which take part in in the process of formation of the state policy. They have
also failed to create party forms of the political life. Finally, they have not
managed to properly ensure and strengthen the base, forms and institutions
of the democratic state. In the atmosphere of intensive political, religious,
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social, and ethical conflicts, a further building of democracy has become
impossible. What is more, its principles, ignored or instrumentally abused
by the majority of the members of the political life, have failed to ingrain
into the society.
This article aims at highlighting the axiological and political foundation
of non-democratic regimes in the Central Asian states. The system of ruling
the country in the Central Asian republics results in their approach towards
a clearly authoritarian model of authority1 and their depart from the demo-
cratic standards guaranteed by the constitutions. It seems, therefore, that
a key meaning for a relatively easy acquisition of authoritarianism in the
states under analysis are revealed by the following factors: historical, cul-
tural and religious traditions, the legacy of the Soviet totalitarianism, their
structural foundation, as well as constitutional and international conditions.
1. Historical and cultural conditions
The understanding and perception of the way the authority is held are
greatly rooted in the historical and cultural basis which applies both to
those governing and the ones being governed, the consequences of which are
both heterogeneous and difficult to combat. Firstly, authority seems to be
the most stable element of the social system from a historical perspective.
While it is true to say that intense conflicts do change its composition and
form, they do not change the very character of the regime. Secondly, the
thesis that authority is based on historical and cultural premises as accep-
ted by the regime and society discourages the authority to undertake deep
changes which could disturb that historically based understanding. It results
in the inadequacy of the regimes to undertake a deep auto-reflection and
inner reformations. Probable changes are caused by a growing discrepancy
between the authority’s demand and what they can really execute (e.g. Ta-
jikistan, Kyrgyzstan). In case of the Central Asian republics, historical and
cultural experiences are characterised mostly by despotic relations on the
level of those who govern and those who are governed connected mostly with
numerous conquests of the regions by Arabs, Persians and Mongols in the
XIX Century by the Russian Empire, as well as a specific clan-organisation
of the society.
1 А. Ю. Мельвиль, О траекториях посткоммунистических трансформаций,
“Полис” 2004, № 2, pp. 64–75.
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In the area of Central Asia there were independents states such as Kho-
rasm (XI–XII Centuries), the Shaybanid Khanate (XVI Century), Kha-
nate of Bukhara (XVI–XX Centuries), Kokand (XVIII–XIX Centuries) and
Khiva (XVI–XX Centuries). They were conquered and destroyed by stron-
ger neighbours form the south and north.2 In XIX Century Central Asia
became the area of the “Great Game” penetration3 and new conquerors –
Russia and England – appeared. When England, with a poor effect, was pe-
netrating Afghanistan, Russia concentrated on its southern neighbour: the
Emirate of Buchara, Khant of Khiva and Kokand. In 1862–1868 the Emi-
rate of Buchara was in war with Russia. In 1866 the Russian Army occupied
the area situated in the south of the contemporary Tajikistan – Khodjent.
Two years later a Russian – Bucharian agreement was signed which decla-
red Russia the owner of the conquered lands and the Emirate was to remain
under the Russian protectorate. In 1867 the Russian-occupied Turkestan
governorship was created in the area conquered by Russia. An intense Rus-
sian colonisation had begun which was intensified in 1899 when the Central
Asia railway was opened.
After the Bolshevik revolution in February 1917 in the areas of the
Russian Central Asia there was a series of “pro-independence” activities.
In April the Russian-occupied Turkestan governorship was cancelled. The
victory of the Revolution of November, 1917 in Central Asia made the Bol-
sheviks active. November 15, 1917 the third district meeting of the Soviets
gathered which proclaimed the victory of the Soviets in Turkestan. In re-
ality, it was not until 1920 that, with the help of the General of the Red
Army, Mikhail Frunze, who fraternally “helped” the Communists in the
Emirate of Buchara, the Soviet rule was declared in Central Asia. In Septem-
ber, 1920 the foundation of the Bukhara People’s Republic was proclaimed.
Earlier, in February, 1920 the People’s Republic of Khorazm was founded.4
The Soviet authority faced an armed resistance of the inhabitants. Resistant
fights of the so-called “basmaches” continued till the beginning of the 30s
in Central Asia.
A lack of historical continuity of the state authority and a native po-
litical centre (which, even if it appeared, was relatively weak) made the
process of the creation of nationalities difficult. As a consequence, it was
2 The history of the Central Asia states is described in: G. R.Capisani, Nowe państwa
Azji Środkowej, Warszawa 2004.
3 See P. Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, Kodan-
sha International 1992.
4 M. Haller, A. Niekricz, Utopia u władzy, Vol. I, Polonia Book Fund LTD, p. 90.
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till the beginning of XX Century that clan-feudal relations of the Central
Ages remained. Their continuation can also be found (although in a changed
form) in the period of the rule of the Soviet where republics where repre-
sented by political dignitaries mostly represented by the local clans’ heads
In those circumstances an advancing state centralism, previously difficult to
achieve in nomad tribes, constituted the essential novum. A cultural model
of the political authority concentrated in the hands of the governor and the
elite (clan) associated with him revives nowadays. It has specific implica-
tions. The leaders of the Central Asia states try hard to establish the image
of their nation’s leaders and tutors rather than their political leaders. Their
power rests in a wide social legitimization as well as the system of mutual
informal connections with “clients”. Regime’s support conditions various
concessions and benefits. The lack of that support may result in the possi-
bility of their deprivation. What is more, it has become the specific elements
of the majority off the post-Soviet states whose system has been described
as patronal presidentialism by Henry Hale.5 In Central Asia a vertical stra-
tification of “clientism” reaches whole societies. In this mechanism almost
everybody can lose. That is why the president is supported.
Cultural traditions are another principle issue conditioning the func-
tioning of non-democratic regimes in the Central Asia republics. Orient
traditions (among which are clan mechanisms of politics, system of general
law, Muslim law), customs and traditions do not only mark one’s lifestyle
but they greatly influence a political process in that region and forming
of the elements of the system which is far from democratic. Tribalism and
mechanisms of clan politics as well as the appeal to a traditional way of life
and religion are unfamiliar with democracy. The apparent danger for a de-
mocratic style of governing are strong renationalisation and strong tradition
of giving somebody an official post on the basis of clan connections or the
potential of army conflicts instead of candidates’ skills. Apart from that,
there is an apparent inclination of the Central Asia political elite to deal
with conflicts with the help of hand rather than conciliation (the so-called
kalaschnikov culture). Cultural traditions result in a growing aggregation of
the authority in the hands of the presidents. Kyrgyzia remains an excep-
tion where, after the “Tulips Revolution”, the president Askar Akajev’s
authoritarian regime was subverted in 2005. However, it is necessary to re-
member that in the Republic of Kyrgyzia social protest was not based on
5 See: H. Hale, Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet
Eurasia, “World Politics” 2005, Vol. 58, No 1, Oct, pp. 133–165.
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the attempt to overthrow a non-democratic way of governing and anti-de-
mocratic character of elections as it was in case of Gruzia and the Ukraine.
In Kyrgyzia the protesters were supporting their local leaders affected by
family and clan bonds.6 After Akajev was overthrown, the novelization of
the constitution took place which significantly strengthened the role and
position of political parties in the political system. Nonetheless, one may
feel anxiety while observing a gradual return to Kurmanbek Bakijev’s pre-
sidential quasi-dictatorship.
In the Central Asia states there has been present a tradition of in-
dividual’s subordination to the hierarchy which has been emphasised by
the institution of family. There is a clear attempt to achieve the state of
safety (social and physical) which was previously guaranteed by the sys-
tem of the USSR. In the eyes of the society safety is more significant than
a few apparent disadvantages of the previous system such as lack of free-
dom of speech, inability to travel internationally, a ban on the contacts
with strangers or administrative limits in daily life. Therefore, the fact that
social trust has been given to politicians who promise to guarantee sta-
bility should not be surprising. An official discourse, where slogans such
as “strong state”, “strong leader” and “strong power” are common, is to
face a very positive feedback. Democracy in this context is not a priority.
Freedom of word and pluralism in the conditions of domestic problems re-
main a secondary issue. Moreover, freedom remains an empty term which is
not completely and properly understood. Its meaning is only limited to the
possibility of using it without a deeper reflection whether it is a real possi-
bility or an illusive one. A distrust to democracy is additionally intensified
by the fact that the policy of liberalization and the values which accom-
pany it seem to be socially strenuous. Individualism and freedom strike the
culturally ingrained values, which may discredit a social traditional mo-
del based on the family, patriarchal authority, obedience to the elderly and
the primacy of the community over an individual. Moreover, in the public
opinion, liberalization and democracy are accompanied by a great deal of
corruption and growing social inequality. It results in a great frustration for
the departure from the model of “general equality” has not been accepted
by everybody.
Cultural traditions influence the way of granting the authority. It is
typical that only small groups of opposition demand democratic elections
6 W. Baluk, Republika Kirgiska, [in:] W. Baluk, A. Czajowski (ed.), Ustroje polityczne
krajów Wspólnoty Niepodległych Państw, Wrocław 2007, p. 254.
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to nominate a leader.7 Both political elites and clans (representatives of the
traditional structure of the local society) find it natural for the governing
presidents to appoint a follower. Bearing in mind the fact that the Central
Asian societies are patriarchal and Muslim, male offspring as well as male
leaders are of great value. The Presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
do not have sons. Therefore, the main role in the local politics is given to
their daughters. Dariga Nazarbajew in Kazakhstan and Gulnar Karimov in
Uzbekistan lead an active public life; the former is a founder and a leader of
the political party “Asar”;8 the latter is a political adviser of her father. As
Andrzej Lomanowski has noted, the system of authority built on traditional
values contradict these values.9 It is not known what the reaction of the
patriarchal society, leaders of the local clans and regional groups will be
when faced with the attempt to give the authority to women. Nonetheless, it
does not change the fact that the above-mentioned presidents have made the
attempt to change it, probably basing on the Russian variant where first one
gets the functions of the President and then confirms that in a referendum
or elections.
Although the Presidents of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have sons, they
have not been preparing them to overtake the authority. The President of
Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Nijazov, was thinking of empowering his son
Murad but he was not interested in governing the country. After Nijazov’s
death there were presidential elections won by Gurbanguly Berdymuchame-
dov who has remained the Chairman of the Parliament ever since.
The Soviet totalitarianism has had a great impact on non-democratic
characteristics of the Central Asian regimes. The system which was built in
the conditions of the domestic war and the Bolshevik elimination of inde-
pendent moods constitutes the basis of the artificial division of the Central
Asia in 1924 and marked the frames of the structural evolution of the Soviet
Republics in the following decades.10 As a result, the republics were built
somehow in an “outer” way and their structural models were mostly based
7 Interesting is the fact that in the Central Asian states only oppsition political parties
and Muslim groups demand free elections.
8 Dariga Nazarbajev holds 80% of the media. Her political party, “Asar”, has had poor
results in the parliamentary elections: A. Orzelska, Kazachstan, [in:] Systemy polityczne
oraz polityka wewnętrzna i zagraniczna w państwach postkomunistycznych Europy i Azji
w latach 2004–2005, J. M. Fiszer, (ed.), Warszawa 2005, p. 152.
9 A. Łomanowski, Wpływ dzieci przywódców Azji Centralnej na sytuację polityczną
i gospodarczą państw regionu, “Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe” II, 2006/2, p. 63.
10 T. Bodio, T. Mołdawa, Konstytucje państw Azji Centralnej. Tradycje i współcze-
sność, Warszawa 2007, p. 15.
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on the borrowed models with a homogeneous system of power, democra-
tic centralism, monopolistic role of the Communist party and sovietisation,
denationalization and displacement of nations.
The Central Asian Republics were born in the minds of the Bolshevik
commissars. They were deprived both of any national traditions and state
structures. On the other hand, they had a very complicated demographic
situation intentionally increased by the actions of the Bolsheviks. The old
imperialistic principle “divide and rule”, which was the creed of the Soviets,
deprived Tajikistan of the two most important cultural centres: Buchara
and Samarkand. Both cities with their inhabitants were given to Uzbekistan
by Stalin. Whole Central Asia was greatly colonized by Russians. Building
national states has remained an ideologically consolidating element of the
regimes of Central Asia after 1990/91.11 Even communists, initially nega-
ting the meaning of independence, and Muslims, referring to pan-Islamic
visions from the past, have made the national ideology their primary mes-
sage. It contradicts the actual ethical structures of the post-soviet republics
of Central Asia. For instance, the ethnic Kazachs constitute less than half
of the inhabitants in their country. Twice the number of Tajiks live out of
their nominal republic. A considerable minority of the Uzbeks live in their
neighbouring republics12 which results in numerous international conflicts.
The period of the USSR rules shaped not only the boundaries of the
states but also their political, economic and social life. The collectivisa-
tion and chaotic industrialization resulted in the collapse of the traditio-
nal social structures and irreparable ecological losses (e.g. drying out of
the Lake Aral). The economy of the Central Asian republics was treated
as a a reservoir of raw materials by Moscow. A strong dependence of the
local enterprise (industrial and agricultural) from the centre and depen-
dence of republics on financial transfers resulted in a dramatic economic
crisis at the beginning of the 90s. A rapid increase of unemployment as
well as pauperization of people caused even more negative phenomena. So-
cial marginalization pushed people towards a criminal net of connections.
There was a rapid growth of corruption, nepotism, organized crime and,
consequently, a growth of Mafia’s influence which was illegally acting in the
economy of the states and collaborating with the state officials to control
11 A few months before the end of the USSR the Soviet Republics of Central Asia did
not show their will to leave the USSR. Michail Gorbaczow was strongly supported by both
the leaders of the Central Asian republics and their inhabitants who explicitly supported
functioning of the USSR in the referendum regarding the future of the Russian Impire
held in March 17, 1991.
12 L. Włodek-Biernat, Po co dziś państwo narodowe, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 13.06.2006.
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the state raw materials. A large scale corruption weakened the legitimiza-
tion of the government and their ability to control the situation within the
state. Groups and clans representing different interests were competing to
get control in the state and promote Muslim, democratic or authoritarian
principles which governed their rules. In such circumstances the consolida-
tion of power in the hands of the local political leaders, who were getting
the real power and independence, took place. As a matter of fact, the in-
stitution of president was being built basing on the remains of the local
communist party’s structures.13 Communists’ actions have had a negative
influence on the local customs and community resulting in the collapse of
some of the traditional social institutions such as “the elders” or Mahallah
– a gathering of citizens who constituted (and still constitute) an informal
element of stability thanks to which there was a relatively low crime rate.
Stalin’s expurgation deprived local clans of their leaders of the family elite
or, in other words, aristocracy. It was replaced by the new, sovietized elite
who had a syndrome of totalitarianism and unconditioned obedience to the
central power ingrained.
2. Foundations of the governmental systems
To define a specific character of the structures of the governmental sys-
tems after the collapse of the USSR, T. Carothers employs the term “grey
zone of democracy”. This term has been applied to the states which have
failed to ingrain democracy and have strong authoritarian tendencies. Such
states remain in a kind of suspension between full dictatorship and stable
liberal democracy. They neither head towards dictatorship nor aim at com-
plete democracy. They are in a transient state. In some states there has
shaped a model of “irresponsible pluralism”, in others the model of “domi-
nating power” (authority) remains.14 The second model has been domina-
ting in the states of Central Asia. It is expressed by the existence of limited
political space, limited participation of opposition parties, dominance of the
political leader or leading party over the political system, governors’ owner-
ship of the state, lack of competitors in elections, and frequent falsification
of elections.
13 М. Олкотт, Центральная Азия: перспективы смены власти, “Pro et Contra”,
том 09, 2005 год, № 1, июль-август, p. 53.
14 T. Carothers, The End of the Transitional Paradigm, “Journal of Democracy” 2002,
vol. 13, nr 1, pp. 5–21.
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The presidential system (in reality, authoritarianism) was to guaran-
tee a successful departure from “anarchic democracy” which had occupied
the post-Soviet lands just after the collapse of the USSR. The leaders of
the states had serious advantages. In the collapsing post-communist world
observed by the society they remained a guarantee of stability and conso-
lidation of the state; they were a point of reference and reliability. In the
initial period they had a true and public legitimization. The appearing au-
thoritarianism was seen not as an individual form of political regime but
only as an active and necessary supplement of the democratic system con-
ditioning the improvement of its success. Undoubtedly, a significant point
of reference for the character of the presidential power in the states situ-
ated in post-soviet lands was the example coming from Moscow. Russia was
gradually leaving the principles of democracy evolving in the direction of
quasi-authoritarianism. The post-Soviet states were not only following that
direction of political changes but they also had a clear support from Mos-
cow where presidential authoritarianism was seen as s significant element of
political stability and control over the states of the region.
The Central Asian republics have gone through the revival of authorita-
rianism in different forms and shapes. The reason for this phenomenon is the
lack of tradition or their own democratic models. This has been supplemen-
ted by the issue of periodical political instability for the post-Soviet regimes
were copying the governmental models through political experiments or do-
mestic wars (in Tajikistan there was a domestic war from 1992 to 1997). The
post-Soviet republics adopted governmental solutions of the western demo-
cracy although the institution of president was based not on the western
model but on the way of how Mikhail Gorbaczov was the president. The
way of understanding the presidential power and its role in the state was
modelled on the USSR. A departure from the democratic standards was
seen not only in the legitimized concentration of power in the hands of the
president but also in the model of sharing the power with the follower in
the framework of some “family” connections or, in other words, basing on
the Russian script of “inheritor”.
In Kazakhstan in 2002 a new law regarding political parties was accep-
ted which introduced rigid criteria of political parties’ registering. As a re-
sult, out of nineteen groups only eleven asked for registering and only seven
were acknowledged as fulfilling the criteria of the law.15 The Constitution of
15 A. Czajowski, Republika Kazachstanu, (in:) W. Baluk, A. Czajowski (ed.), Ustroje
polityczne krajów Wspólnoty Niepodległych Państw, Wrocław 2007, p. 231.
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Uzbekistan states that the social life of the state is based on the “founda-
tions of pluralism of political institutions, ideology and views”. As a matter
of fact, the system of holding the authority is strongly repressive. The op-
position is weak and infiltrated by special services. In the country there are
neither independent non-governmental organizations nor independent mass
media. Muslims, accused of radicalism by the regime, are especially subjec-
ted to repressions. Constant limits of the opposition in the Central Asian
states have made the appearance of alternative elites impossible who, with
the help of political means, could express the interests of social and regional
groups. As a result, the opposition has gone through islamisation as well as
radicalization which have caused a growing terrorism.
3. Constitutional conditioning
The constitutions of the independent states of Central Asia were dicta-
ted by the presidents who, being acquainted with the only model of holding
authority, declared for the presidential system for their personal interest.
The Constitution of Kazakhstan of December 16, 1991 in art. 2 states di-
rectly that Kazakhstan is a state of a presidential form of governing. It goes
without saying that these constitutions are often treated instrumentally.
In the states of “grey sphere of democracy” there is a change of the
constitution before a possible change of the head of the state. The reasons
of this situation are different. Inner divisions which are one of the essential
elements of the power alternation have started to take place in the pro-pre-
sidential groupings. The president, who is going to resign and who has
concentrated the great deal of power so far, starts reaching for the balance
in the division of power (president – parliament – government). Such events
took place in Kyrgyzia where in 2003 the President Askar Akajev initiated
the constitutional referendum ratifying the growth of the importance of the
parliament and the president-parliamentary form of governing. The reason
for doing so was that Akajev had a personal interest rather than he was
worried about the state clearly advancing towards authoritarianism.16
However, changes of the constitution are more commonly carried out
to strengthen the position of the president or/and to guarantee him a the
ability to hold the post longer. The fact that constitutions or their nove-
lizations have been accepted by people in a referendum has a significant
16 W. Baluk, op. cit., p. 253.
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importance. The President of Kazakhstan Nazarbajev (whose post was to
finish in 1996) decided to extend it till 2000. To do that in March, 1995 he
proclaimed a national referendum regarding the extension of the term of his
obeying the president till December 1, 2000. In August, 1995 he declared
a referendum to adopt a new constitution. With the approval of Nazarbajev
in 1998 changes were introduced into the constitution which enabled the
Parliament to shorten the term of holding the presidential post. As a result,
presidential election ahead of time were conducted in 1999. Simultaneously,
other profitable changes for the president were introduced into the consti-
tution: the term of the presidential post was prolonged to seven years, the
lowest limit as to the age of the candidates was changed from the age of 35
to the age of 40 years old whereas the highest limit of age was cancelled;
the requirement of the 50% frequency for elections to be valid was cancel-
led. In June, 2000 Nazarbajev was given full powers of unlimited duration
(life-long) to govern the state (as well as life-long financial and personal se-
curity). By the novelization of May, 2007 the term was shortened to 5 years
and the regulation was accepted that the article limiting the presidential
office up to two terms does not apply to the first President of Kazakhstan.17
The referendum regarding the extension of the presidential office of the
President Emolala Rachmanov from 4 to 7 years took place in Tajikistan in
September, 1999.18 One more referendum was carried out in June, 2003 to
adopt some changes into the constitution so that Rachmonov could stay two
more consecutive presidential terms;19 in June 22, 2003 respective changes
were introduced into the constitution.
The extension of the presidential office term of the President of Uzbe-
kistan, Islam Karimov, was approved in the referendum in 1995. Karimov,
elected to be the president in 1991, on the strength of the referendum was
given the right to extend his term till 2000. After the elections in Janu-
ary, 2000 he officially started his “first” term. In 2002 one more referendum
was conducted on the strength of which his term was extended to 2007; in
April, 2007 the constitution was changed to extend the presidential term
to 7 years although the limit of only two terms of holding the presidential
17 M. Czerwiński, Prezydent jako głowa władzy wykonawczej – model Białoruski,
(in:) Władza wykonawcza w Polsce i Europie, (ed.) M. Drzonek, A. Wołek, Kraków –
Nowy Sącz 2009, p. 200.
18 В Таджикистане прошел референдум. Предполагается внесение достаточно
существенных поправок в действующую Конституцию, “Независимая газета” 28.
09.1999.
19 К. Дэвис, Рахмонов сможет править до 2020 года, http://news8.thdo.bbc.co.uk/
hi/russian/news/newsid 3012000/3012084.stm (10.07.2009).
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office was not annulled. Apart from that, in 2007 Karimov participated in
the elections, won them and started his “second” term.
Aparent “tinkering” of the head of the state with the constitution took
place in Turkmenistan. In 1994 a referendum was conducted whose re-
sults approved the extension of the President Saparmurat Nijazov, elected
in 1992, to 2002. Then the presidential elections, which were to take place
in 1997, were cancelled. In 1998 the ban regarding limiting the presidential
office term was annulled. In 1999 the Parliament took a decision to grant the
president a life-long office term. After Nijazov died in 2006, there appeared
a necessity to introduce immediate changes into the constitution because
the factual law did not allow for the election of the next president.
4. International conditioning
The collapse of the USSR in 1991 resulted in numerous consequences
not only for the international system but first of all for the inhabitants of
the post-Soviet lands. The collapse of the USSR started the processes of
disintegration. The states which appeared in the ruins of the Soviet Empire
had to choose the orientation of their international policy and safety. The
definition of their policy and relations with the former leader – Russia – was
of primary significance. However, economic relations were of no less impor-
tance. The economics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzia and Tajikistan are greatly
dependant on the exchange of goods with Russia. Economic and political
bonds have resulted in the process of reintegration, which is exemplified
by the foundation of the Union of Independent states in 1991, the Taxa-
tion Union in 1995, in 2000 it was reorganized into the Eurasian Economic
Community and in 2002 into the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
After the collapse of the USSR Russian strategists faced the dilemma:
to stay directly in the region or to support the creation of the buffer sphere
in Central Asia, protecting “south flank” from the dangers coming from Asia
(drug trade, organized crime, and terrorism). Finally, the middle variant was
chosen. Together with the Central Asian states Russia created a economic
sphere which was collective, although controlled by Russia (WNP) as well
as military sphere (the Taschkent Pact). From the Russian perspective, the
condition of successful function of the post-Soviet sphere was not to allow
alien world-powers (UE, USA, China) to intervene in the the domestic affairs
of the states under the control of Russia as well as to continue political
solutions in accordance with the will of the Kreml. Personal (authoritarian)
power of the president in Central Asia was seen as a more beneficial (for
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it was easier to control, addict and manipulate) than collective power of
the Parliament (democracy). Therefore, the local leaders could rely on the
Russian help in their conflicts with the political opposition, which made
them even more addicted to Moscow.
In the second half of the 90s the Russian control over the region de-
creased. In some states attempts to weaken the relations with Moscow ap-
peared. The post-Soviet states started advancing in the direction of Turkey,
Iran and Pakistan. The interests of China, and later the USA and UE, were
focused on whole Central Asia.
At the beginning of this century the political role of Central Asia in-
creased significantly. It was influenced by some aspects. Firstly, the region
had become important for the USA because of their anti-terrorist operations
in Afghanistan. Secondly, Russia’s control over the region had decreased
because of the engagement of the USA and China. Thirdly, it appeared that
the region could become the alternative for the Near East in the production
of energetic material. The fourth reason was that Central Asia had become
the area of penetration of the Muslim terrorists. An anti-terrorist union of
Moscow and Washington against the Talibs in Afghanistan was the chance
to introduce deep changes in the situation in Central Asia.20 The Central
Asian states bordering with the front-line were necessary as a logistical base
of the coalition army. By allowing the American forces to use their lands,
those states could expect not only financial help but also they could treat
the presence of the USA as a counterbalance for the influence of Russia. The
change in the layout of the force encouraged formulating demands addressed
to Moscow. Coolness in the relations with the USA and the increase of
political and economic pressure in the states were Russia’s reactions to
the changes in the region. It resulted in breaking the agreement of leasing
the bases by Americans in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan as well as a quite
sudden distance to the decision of building ways of transmitting oil and gas
alternative to Russia.
“Colourful revolutions” were a decisive impulse pushing some states
back to cooperation with Moscow. Authoritarian of the post-Soviet states
presidents came to the conclusion that their cooperation with the USA
encourages democratic revolts which could deprive them of their force. No-
netheless, leaders of the states in that region are constantly searching for
alternative solutions for the deep relations with Russia, China and the USA.
20 Read more: М. Олкотт, Второй шанс Центральной Азии, Москва – Вашингтон
2005.
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The European Union is one of the possible partners. In 2009 Brussels activa-
ted the force to initiate the Nabucco gas main, which was greatly approved
of, for example, on Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. A deeper
penetration of the EU politics in Central Asia can stimulate certain limited
social and political reforms.
5. Religious traditions
In the territory of Central Asia Islam is a dominating religion altho-
ugh its power does not affect political power. The position of religion on
the margins of social and political life is certainly one of the indications of
the Communist legacy. In the Soviet Union the issue of Islam was margi-
nalized in the interest of the regime. Soviet scientists in accordance with
the suggestion of the authority were interested in Islam only in the context
of their anthropological and religious research.21 What is more, it was “So-
viet” Islam or, in other words, totally deprived of identity and paralysed
by the governing system. The extermination of the Muslim clergy and two
changes of the alphabet in the period of twenty years (firstly, from Arabic
to Latin, and then to Cyrillic) accompanied by the ban on the possession
and popularization of any religious literature destroyed the chance of cul-
tural growth of the local people for many years. The majority of Muslims
adapted themselves to the new conditions, which resulted in the society’s
secularization and sovietization in many cases. In the Muslim Central Asian
republics, just as it was in the Soviet Empire, there prevailed a universal
Communist system and legalized atheism. Islam was generally practised by
the elderly. It was rather the element of tradition with no influence on the
course if action.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union a revival of the religion and
politicizing of Islam took place. The Renaissance of Islam was mainly caused
by the search for Muslim identity and individuality, occasional becoming
the weapon in a political fight. Yet, those who governed were Moscow’s
deputies; they quickly adopted themselves to the new conditions replacing
the red flag of communism with the green flag of the Prophet. It allowed
them to preserve the power in already independent states which had quickly
changed the past image from the universal Soviet and atheist to the national,
Muslim, more or less subordinated to Islam. The power in the regions was
21 Compare Н. Азыров, Эволюция ислама в СССР, Москва 1973.
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being overtaken by the local elites replacing ethnically (and religiously) alien
Russians. The consequence of that was republics’ deprivation of significant
channels of political representation on a central level.22 At the same time
it appeared that the local leaders frequently used Islam in a shallow way.
They did not hesitate to fight Muslim parties and groupings when it came
to the fight for power.
Undoubtedly, the neighbouring Muslim countries, especially Iran and
the Saudi Arabia and to certain degree Turkey, have had a significant in-
fluence on the expansion of Islam in the post-Soviet republics of Central
Asia. It has been estimated that a total number of Islam believers in the
independent states of Central Asia (and in autonomic republics of Russian
Federation – Volga Federal district and North Caucasus) has reached over
60 millions. So far, apart from the active infiltration and help coming from
the Afghan Talibs as well as the aids from such countries as Iran and Paki-
stan, the attempts to ingrain the Islam fundamentalism in any of the Cen-
tral Asian states have failed. Nevertheless, it is necessary to remember that
Islamic fundamentalists, wahabits, who constitute the young counter-elite
fighting for “souls’ governing” with moderate “traditionalists” are the main
source endangering the safety of the states.23
In Central Asia Islam appears in three main dimensions. Firstly, it is
an element of the individual and group identity. Secondly, it is a national
and state-building factor. Thirdly, it constitutes an ideological and logisti-
cal base to fight for the change of the political, social and cultural order.24
Nowadays Islam is a significant aspect of building and defining of group and
individual identity of the regional societies.25 Muslim elites and structures
are enjoying a good social reputation. Such a situation is perceived by the
authority as a kind of endangered status quo. For this reason the activities
of the Muslim political parties and religious organizations is frequently li-
mited or even combated. The Constitution of Tajikistan 1994 introduced
a ban on the activities of the parties of a religious character which stroke
the main source of the Tajikistan opposition, Islamic Renaissance Party of
22 D. Glinski, Russia and Its Muslims: The Politics of Identity at the International-Do-
mestic Frontier, “East European Constitutional Review” 2002, nr 1/2, vol. 11, p. 75.
23 Read: А. А. Казанцев, “Ваххабизм”: опыт когнитивного анализа институтов
в ситуации социокультурного кризиса, “Polis” 2002, nr 5.
24 A. Jerska, Rozdroża islamu, “Recykling Idei”, nr 2/2004.
25 Ислам на постсоветском пространстве: взгляд изнутри, под ред. А. Мала-
шенко и М. Брилл Олкотт;Моск. Центр Карнеги. – М.: Арт – Бизнес – Центр, август
2001.
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Tajikistan.26 The Constitution’s novelization of 1999 introduced a permis-
sion to organize religious parties. However, in June, 2004 the Parliament of
Tajikistan passed a change in the suffrage law according to which on the
day of elections there was a ban on the presence of armed outsiders and
representatives of political parties taking part in the elections in polling
stations.
The influence of Islam in the region is growing together with the inten-
sity of a political situation in some states.27 Crushing the democratic and
nationalistic opposition makes Islam, with its structures and deep roots in
the society, an attractive alternative to corrupted and compromised poli-
tical groupings connected with the regime. Occasionally, religion has been
serving as the strongest base for the opposition fighting not only for their
traditions but also for the religious state.
6. Dangers brought by terrorism
The states of Central Asia are nowadays facing dangers brought by
terrorism. Central Asia has become the area which is deeply infiltrated by
terrorist groups and organizations penetrating from the lands of Afghani-
stan in the northern direction to Russia. A very intense situation is taking
place on the boarders of Afghanistan and Tajikistan28 and in the Fergana
Valley divided between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Due to the
density of the population, their poverty, unemployment, as well as ethnical,
economic and social conflicts this region has become the place especially
susceptible to the influence of Muslim radicals. By the end of the 90s the
Fergana Valley had become the place of the activities of the Islamic Mo-
vement of Uzbekistan, founded in 1998 by the Tajikian veterans of the do-
mestic war and the soldiers fighting in Afghanistan in 1979–1989 (including
Russians). The main aim of the Islamic Movement was to create the Islamic
state in the Fergana Valley.29 The priority and a long-term goal involved
overthrowing the government in Uzbekistan and creating the Islamic state
“Kalifatu Buchary” including the area of Central Asia. There were attempts
26 Z. Cierpiński, Republika Tadżykistanu, (in:) W. Baluk, A. Czajowski (ed.), Ustroje
polityczne krajów Wspólnoty Niepodległych Państw, Wrocław 2007, p. 286.
27 A. Jerska, op. cit.
28 J. Wendle,How Afghanistan’s War Is Spilling into Central Asia, “Time”, 22.07.2009.
29 H. Głębocki, Radykalizm islamski w Azji Środkowej jako czynnik zbliżenia między
Rosją a Chinami, “Biuletyn”, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2005, p. 186.
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to achieve that goal by the use of force: attacks on Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz-
stan (in August, 2000) which were to initiate a common Islamic revolt as well
as attacks of terror in Zacaucasus. The Islamic Movement has been thought
to be responsible for the attacks in Buchara as well as the ones taking place
nearby the Embassies of the USA and Israel in Tashkent. In 2006 mudzahe-
adins attacked Kyrgyzia.30 Uzbekistan is especially exposed to the Islamic
Movement actions. In the governmental propaganda the movements of the
Islamic groups are thought to be the biggest inner enemy. All anti-govern-
mental performances are thought to be organized by the Islamic grouping
Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation). The intensification of repressive action
as referred to the opposition results in the growth of its population. It is
difficult to state explicitly which direction the above-mentioned conflict is
going to take. Certainly, terrorism and the ways of fighting it constitute one
of the most significant aspects of the legitimization of power as refereed to
the local political leaders.
Summary
The struggle of authoritarianism with democracy in Central Asia leads
towards the victory of the former. However, it is necessary to remember
that authoritarianism in the region is internally differentiated, taking dif-
ferent forms and shapes: anocracy appears in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzia;31
authoritarianism in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in Turkmenistan there was
totalitarianism connected with the cult of the president Saparmurad Nija-
zov. The political system in Kyrgyzia seems to be the closest to the demo-
cratic one. It is partly explained by the specific character of the Kyrgyzian
society which reveals ancestral and tribal structure characterized by the ab-
sence of authority uniting all nomadic groups and tribes.32 Ironic is the fact
that the constitutional procedures of democracy are being successfully used
to strengthen the powers of the president, which increases authoritarianism.
30 W. Jagielski, Mudżhedini rozlewają się po Azji, “Gazeta Wyborcza” 02.07.2009.
31 In 2003 there was a novelization of the Constitution of Kyrgyzia. The newly accepted
regulations made a huge step towards democracy. First of all, only two presidential terms
taken by the same person were maximally accepted and the institution of a spokesperson
of civil rights was established. In 2005 in Kyrgyzia there was the “Revolution of Tulips”
which resulted in the abolishion of Akajev’s regime.
32 A. Wierzbicki, A. Zamarajewa, P. Załęski, Problemy transformacji, integracji i bez-
pieczeństwa narodowego w badaniach naukowców z Azji Centralnej, “Studia Politolo-
giczne” 2008, vol. 12, p. 58.
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Apart from the declared civil rights and freedoms and the division of power,
the constitutions of the Central Asian states in fact remain a collection of
catchwords interpreted by the heads of the states in accordance with their
needs. In turn, referendum, being one of the strongest forms of indirect de-
mocracy, in a sophisticated way is being used to build a stronger position
of the president abusing democracy at the same time.
The failure of a democratic system in the majority Central Asian states
has many sources. Lack of people’s trust to the authority makes a success-
ful democratic foundation of the state impossible. People do not trust the
authority because the political elite to a greater extent is recruited among
the bureaucratic nomenclature created at the times of the Soviet Union
(therefore having nothing common with a democratic system). Additional,
modern political classes in the region are characterized by the absence of
ideas, fear of the new, and trust in the market economics rather than trust
in democracy.
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